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ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the activity of the Basque fleet during the mackerel fishing season and 
presents an economic analysis of the equilibrium of this fishery. It seeks to determine whether its eco-
nomic structure represents an internal factor explaining the fishermen’s behaviour. The inverse demand 
function and the average cost function are therefore estimated. Moreover, the analysis conducted here 
also takes into account the institutional dimension by factoring in current fishery regulation measures. 
Conclusions are drawn as to whether the incentives provided by the management measures and the stra-
tegy of fishermen are optimal on the basis of the estimated economic functions.
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Estructura económica de la actividad pesquera: un análisis de la gestión 
de la pesquería del verdel en el País Vasco
RESUMEN: Este trabajo analiza la actividad de la flota vasca durante la costera del verdel y presenta 
un análisis económico del equilibrio de esta pesquería. Se pretende determinar si su estructura económica 
representa un factor interno que explica el comportamiento de los pescadores. Así, se estiman la función 
inversa de demanda y la función de costes medios. Además, el análisis también considera la dimensión 
institucional, incorporando las actuales medidas de regulación de la pesquería. Se concluye analizando si los 
incentivos generados por las medidas de gestión y la estrategia de los pescadores son óptimos en base a las 
funciones económicas estimadas.
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1. Introduction 
European fisheries have battled for many years against poor profitability due to 
the low ex-vessel prices reached at markets, among other reasons. Thus, considering 
the current low prices and high fuel costs, catching as much as possible represents 
the optimal way to increase economic profits at reasonable discount rates from the 
fishermen’s perspective in many fisheries. This has led the Basque North East At-
lantic Mackerel (NEAM) fleet1, as is the case with other European fleets, to fish in 
some years more than the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) set by the authorities for this 
stock. In fact, although the NEAM fishery is subject to regulation (TAC, daily limits, 
etc.), fishermen act by maximising their individual revenues without taking into ac-
count issues such as the market, the situation of the stock or the performance of the 
fleet as a whole, i.e. they act as if access were unrestricted. Indeed, the structure of 
the demand and cost functions could well be causing the “race” by fishermen to in-
crease their catches. This paper therefore focuses on estimating the demand and cost 
functions for NEAM Basque fishery to check whether the economic structure per se 
represents an internal factor explaining the fishermen’s behaviour and, in particular, 
the traditional “race for the resource”. Moreover, this paper analyses the degree of 
success of the implemented management measures and how it is affected by the eco-
nomic structure, among other factors.
This paper sets out to analyse the economic situation of the Basque fleet engaged 
in the fishing season for mackerel (this season is called “costera”) by examining 
the static equilibrium of the fishery, based on estimations of the demand and cost 
functions. It seeks to provide detailed knowledge of the key factors that condition the 
ex-vessel price of the stock analysed, and of the production structure and fleet costs. 
To that end, the first step is to identify and estimate the demand function of the mar-
ket for initial sales. Given the rigidity that characterises the market supply of perisha-
ble products, the focus here is on the inverse demand function. The inverse demand 
function for this market is estimated and an analysis is then run to determine whether 
the strategy conventionally used by fishermen of maximising revenue via catches can 
be justified in terms of economic efficiency. An analysis of whether the regulation 
measures introduced by the Spanish authorities in recent years can help to increase 
profitability through higher prices is also conducted. We then empirically define 
and estimate the average cost curve associated with the mackerel fishery and use the 
results to learn, among other things, the gap between mackerel prices (expressed via 
inverse demand) and the operating costs associated with the fishing season. Finally, 
the estimated curves are used to calculate and analyse the economic equilibrium of 
the fishery. 
This mackerel fishery has been selected as the case study for two main reasons. 
First, as the profitability of this fleet is one of the main concerns for the fishing sector 
itself and for the regional, state and European administrations. As a consequence, po-
licy makers have introduced new regulations to manage this fishery in recent years: 
1 The Basque fleet consists of all vessels whose home port is located in the Basque Country (North of Spain).
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A technological allocation criteria in early 2010; individual landing limits from 2009 
to 2013; and finally individual quotas in 2014 (a detailed description of these regula-
tions is introduced in Section 2). Second, as it is one of the most important fisheries 
for the Basque inshore fleet and also of great economic and social importance at in-
ternational level (particularly for the countries on the Atlantic Arc, i.e. Spain, France 
and Portugal). The mackerel stock is managed annually via area-based TACs. The 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) provides advice on the 
admissible exploitation of the stock throughout its distribution as a whole, but that 
advice is transferred to two TACs: The Northern area (IIa, IIIa,b,d, IV, Vb, VI, VII, 
VIIIa,b,d,e, XII, XIV in ICES nomenclature) and the Southern area (which includes 
areas VIIIc & IXa in the ICES nomenclature). The most important stock for the Spa-
nish fleet (and hence for the Basque fleet) is precisely that allocated to it in the South 
area, where they obtain over 90 % of their total catch. Spain holds 82 % of the total 
TAC for the South area, with the rest being allocated to Portugal and, to a much les-
ser extent, to France. Mackerel catches in the Basque Country accounts for between 
36 % and 48 % of the total volume of catches of all species by the Basque inshore 
fleet between 2001 and 2008 years (Section 2 provides detailed information).
In any fishery, management must deal with economic, biological, social and even 
political objectives. This paper focuses on economic objectives, but also takes into 
account the biological sustainability targets set by the administration through the es-
tablishment of various regulatory measures. For instance, this stock is currently sub-
ject to a long-term management plan, and scientists recommend that fishing efforts 
and catches should be tailored to that plan. This consideration prevails over other 
criteria such as Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)2 and the Precautionary Appro-
ach (PA)3 (ICES, 2010), so the long-term management plan is considered to be the 
benchmark for the analyses conducted here.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the case study analysed. 
Section 3 devotes to the empirical specification and estimation of the demand and 
cost functions and describes the results obtained from it. Section 4 provides a dis-
cussion of the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Case Study: Mackerel and its Current Management
2.1. The Mackerel Stock and its Management under TACs
Mackerel (Scomber scombrus) is a scombrid species found in the Mediterranean and 
the Atlantic. As pointed out above the ICES provides advice on permissible exploitation 
for the NEAM distribution area as a whole, and that advice is the basis for two TACs: 
One for the North area and the other for the South.
2 MSY is the largest average catch or yield that can continuously be taken from a stock under existing environ-
mental condition. ICES Glossary (http://www.ices.dk/pages/Glossary.aspx).
3 Threshold on exploitation (catch, mortality, effort) consistent with a management strategy or international 
agreement (e.g. exploitation boundary consistent with precautionary approach). ICES Glossary (http://www.
ices.dk/pages/Glossary.aspx).
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TABLE 1
Catches & TACs (in thousands of tonnes) by the international, Spanish 
and Basque mackerel fleets*
Year TAC (international)a
Catches 
(international)
TAC 
(South)
Catches in south 
area VIIIc & IXa 
(Spain + Portugal + 
France)
Catches 
(total of 
Spain)
Catches 
(only 
Basque 
Country)
Catches % 
(Basque/
Spain)
1989 532 590 36.6 18.3 16.6 5.9 36
1990 562 628 36.6 21.3 17.9 8 45
1991 612 668 36.6 20.8 22 11 50
1992 707 760 36.6 18 17.2 9 52
1993 767 825 36.6 19.7 20.9 11 53
1994 837 821 36.6 25 27.1 13.5 50
1995 645 756 36.6 27.5 29.2 14.1 48
1996 452 564 30 34.1 33.4 15.6 47
1997 470 570 35 40.7 46.5 24.1 52
1998 549 667 35 44.2 44.6 15.8 35
1999 562 640 35 43.8 45.9 22.2 48
2000 612 739 39.2 36.1 38.3 18.2 48
2001 670 737 40.2 43.2 44.1 23.3 53
2002 683 773 41.1 49.6 50.1 18.6 37
2003 583 670 35 26 23.8 6.7 28
2004 532 650 32.3 34.8 34.5 15.5 45
2005 422 543 24.9 49.6 52.8 23.9 45
2006 444 473 26.2 52.8 54.1 18.1 33
2007 502 579 29.6 62.8 62.9 24.5 39
2008 458 611 27 59.9 64.6 29.1 45
2009 605b 735 35.8 107.7 114.1 49 43
2010 885c 869 33.9 55.1 52.7 19 36
2011 959c 939 37.1 19.7 18.7 8 43
2012 927c 893 36.7 20.1 19.4 12 62
2013 906c 932 31.2 16.7 16.4 6 37
2014 1,396c 1,394 56.6 38.4 29.0 11 38
a All areas except some captures in international waters in sub-area II.
b It does not include the unilateral Norway/Faroe Islands TAC first declared in 2009, nor the Iceland quota.
c No internationally agreed quotas. Values presented are the sum of unilateral quotas.
Source: Own elaboration based on data from ICES (ICES, 2012; 2015) and the AZTI fishery database.
Given its economic and social importance at international level, this mackerel 
fishery is currently one of the most highly valued in the European Union (EU). Table 
1 shows the main variables in the international fishery. Annual catches of the species 
from 1989 to 2014 averaged 732,000 tonnes, though with considerable variation from 
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one year to another. A breakdown by countries shows that in recent years the fleets of 
Norway and the UK have made the largest catches (25 % of the total), though those 
of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Russia and Spain have also taken significant 
quantities (between 5 and 10 % of the total).
Table 1 shows the total catches (for all areas) by the Spanish fleet, where the quan-
tity corresponding specifically to the Basque vessels is detailed in a different column. 
In spite of the fact that this stock has not been at its best in recent years, the Basque 
and the Spanish fleets have, in some years, landed catches far in excess of the quota 
allocated to them under the TAC, as can be seen in Table 1. Indeed, in some recent 
years Spain has landed twice as much as its allocated TAC (three times as much in 
2009). In 2008 and 2009, the catches landed by the Basque fleet alone amounted to 
more than the TAC for the whole of Spain. Fishing activities in Basque ports accoun-
ted for 44 % of all the catches landed by the Spanish fleet between 1989 and 2014, 
making the Basque fleet the largest mackerel fleet fishing from home ports in Spain.
2.2. Distribution of the quota by gear and semester 
A Spanish national regulation was implemented in 2010 with the aim of distri-
buting the Spanish catch quota by gear, with the quota being 30.5 % for trawlers, 
27.7 % for purse seiners and 34.6 % for artisanal fisheries. In all cases, 7 % of the 
catches should be kept for the second half of the year.
The basic idea is to prevent particular types of high-performance fishing gear 
from constraining the fishing possibilities open to other gears and hogging the Spa-
nish quota. This gives each gear at least the possibility of catching the percentage 
allocated to it, but it does not prevent interaction on the market between catches lan-
ded with different types of gear.
2.3. Daily limits
In addition to the limits set via TACs, quotas and shares allocated to each gear, 
there are also daily limits on the amount of fish that can be landed. Such limits must 
be seen as ways of preventing the market from being flooded on a particular day, thus 
enabling higher overall prices to be assured and preventing low-capacity gears from 
having their prices undercut by large quantities landed by vessels using high-capacity 
gears. Daily limits on catches were set in 2008 (second semester) and 2009 (Orden 
ARM/2091/2008)4. These regulations were overturned for the 2010 fishing season by 
Orden ARM 271/2010 and Orden ARM/1054/2010, which regulated stocks more ex-
plicitly. Finally, in 2011 Orden ARM/3315/2010 introduced an additional regulation 
allocating a new daily limit per vessel, by European mandate5.  
4 Catches of 20,000 kg/vessel for otter trawls, 30,000 kg/vessel for pair trawls, 1500 kg/crewman for purse sein-
ers and 1000 kg/crewman for other gears (gillnets, hand lines and long lines).
5 A quota of 8,000 kg/vessel for purse seiners and bottom trawlers and 2,300 kg/vessel for the artisanal category 
known as “artes menores”. This category, that grouped all the boats using artisanal fishing methods, restricted 
the membership to this group in relation with a maximum total length of 18 meters and a horse power maximum 
of 250 HP.
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Interviews were organised with local fishermen representatives, while focus 
groups6 were organised with both local fishermen and local scientists. Other manage-
ment measures are not considered for this fishery and, in fact, in the opinion of local 
fishermen (based on these interviews and focus groups), daily limits are an appro-
priate measure because this measure allows for a simplification of the daily fishing 
work, although they think the main problem is based on the previously established 
low TAC from which the daily limits are derived. Fishermen consider that the TAC 
should be higher based on their empirical evidence. 
2.4. Mackerel Fishing by the Basque Fleet
In the Basque Country, mackerel is caught mainly by the inshore fleet, especially 
by hand lines and purse seiners. Much smaller amounts of mackerel are also landed 
by vessels that use gillnets and bottom-set long-lines. Line-fishing and purse-seine 
vessels based in the Basque Country account for between 90 % and 95 % of the 
mackerel landed at Basque ports (the rest is landed by vessels based mainly at ports 
in Cantabria, Asturias and Galicia). Catches by vessels using bottom trawl nets have 
increased by more than 200 % since the beginning of the last decade. Up to 2001 
these vessels only occasionally landed more than 6000 tonnes of mackerel, compared 
to the average figures of 20,000 tonnes for artisanal vessels and 16,000 for purse sei-
ners. From 2002 onwards the amounts caught by each type of gear began to converge.
Hand-line and purse-seine mackerel fishing vessels are extremely important in 
inshore fishing by the Basque fleet as a whole. Mackerel is the main target species 
in terms of landings in the Basque Country (with all types of gear), accounting for 
between 36 % and 48 % of the total volume of catches of all species by the Basque 
inshore fleet between 2001 and 2008 (though in 2003 the figure fell to 14 % due to 
the temporary closure of the fishery following the sinking of the oil tanker Prestige). 
In terms of revenue, mackerel is the third most important, behind albacore (Thunnus 
alalunga) and anchovy (Engraulis encrachicolus), accounting for around 11 % of 
the total revenue of the inshore fleet (just 5 % in 2003). However, the percentage of 
overall income accounted for by this fishery varies depending on the total activity 
of each vessel throughout the year (vessels change metier7 during the year). Thus, it 
accounts for between 22 and 40 % of the annual earnings of Basque vessels fishing 
with hand lines, though the figure is higher for trolling vessels in the summer (a 
fishing technology that provides 40 % of all the revenue of this fleet). Furthermore, 
with the crisis that has hit anchovy fishing in recent years, mackerel has accounted 
for as much as 45 % in some years. For the live-bait and purse-seiner fleet based on 
the Basque Country, mackerel accounts for between 6 and 18 % of annual earnings, 
depending on the amount of albacore, anchovy and bluefin tuna (Thunnus tynnus) 
that they land. Finally, mackerel provides between 1 % and 15 % of the annual ear-
6 Focus groups are widely used in the fisheries field including stakeholders (fishermen, administration, scien-
tists...) organised by working groups.
7 “Metier” means a group of fishing operations intended to catch similar species (or groups of species) with 
similar gear during the same period of the year or in the same area, characterised by similar operational models.
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nings of trawl vessels, depending on how much hake (Merluccius merluccius) and 
other species they catch. 
3. Model Specification and Empirical Analysis
3.1. Empirical Specification and Estimation of the Demand Function
The data used in this study are taken from the AZTI fishery database. This data-
base introduces information from logbooks and sales notes provided by the Basque 
Government, which publishes information on each fish auction. Specifically, infor-
mation gathered in 2007 is used. The reason why data from other years have not 
been considered lies partly in a lack of detailed information and partly in the fact that 
2007 was the last year in which fishing was not subject to any regulations intended 
to affect the economic component of fisheries (see above). The database used for the 
study comprises 3,395 entries once the information has been processed. It thus covers 
93 % of the total catches recorded in the AZTI fishery database for 2007 (22,860 t 
out of a total of 24,500 t). These entries represent the daily landings from each vessel, 
according to the size of the fish. The number of vessels taking part in this fishery du-
ring 2007 was 235, which landed the majority of their catches at six different ports: 
Bermeo, Donostia, Getaria, Hondarribia, Lekeitio and Ondarroa. 
In this study the inverse demand function for mackerel is estimated assuming 
that supply is completely inelastic and does not react to price. On perishable product 
markets, where products cannot be stored, quantity is usually taken as given exoge-
nously, so price is determined exclusively by demand (see for instance Huang, 1988; 
Barten and Bettendorf, 1989; Eales et al., 1997). Moreover, all the regulations and 
interventions on the part of the authorities (TACs, control of fishing effort, limitation 
on the entry of vessels, etc.) also help ensure that price is not a factor in the determi-
nation of total supply, which is determined rather by factors external to the market 
(Asche and Hannesson, 2002; Herrmann and Criddle, 2006). Therefore, fisheries are 
among the few cases in economic literature in which inverse demand functions are 
considered to be plausible alternatives to simultaneous supply/demand systems (Gor-
man, 1959).
The mackerel market is no exception to this. Daily supply is not determined by 
demand, and may even exceed the daily limits set by the authorities. This is because 
fishermen usually adopt a strategy of maximising the volume of their catches and 
may thus flood the daily market. Fishermen do not care about market or other type of 
considerations when deciding mackerel fishing strategy. This is, among other issues, 
due to their perception about the good biological situation of the stock, which pushes 
fishermen to catch as much as possible. This perception, as part of the huge expert 
knowledge, is gained from focus groups with fishermen. This paper has benefited 
from several focus groups organised according to the different technologies: Purse 
seiners, artisanal ﬂeet, and offshore trawlers. Each focus group, with a mean of 15 
people involved, was organised at the NUTS 2 level, that is, including two ﬁshermen 
from each of the most important ports in the Basque Country. 
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Identifying the inverse demand function requires not just quantity to be defined 
but also all the other variables (shifters) that influence the price that purchasers 
(mostly wholesalers) are willing to pay. A number of shifters are tested, including 
the size of the fish, the fishing techniques, the port where catches are landed and the 
fishing grounds. Of these variables, the size of fish caught, the fishing techniques 
and the port are found to be significant and are therefore included in the specification 
of the function. The fishing grounds are also significant for some categories, but are 
closely linked to the fishing technique and therefore improve the goodness of fit only 
marginally.
The fishing technique affects the freshness and quality of landings and, to a lesser 
extent, the channels through which mackerel is marketed. The main technologies 
used to catch the species are hand lines, purse seiners, gillnets, trawls and coastal 
trawls. When examining the differences, hand lines are taken as the baseline and the 
following dummy variable is considered:
where h = PS, Gi, Tr, CTr represents the purse seiners, gillnets, trawls and coastal 
trawls technologies respectively. 
Appreciable differences in price are observed depending on size (the bigger the 
fish, the higher the price). The effect of fish size on prices is factored in by means of 
a dummy variable based on classifying catches into three size groups8: Small macke-
rel, medium-sized mackerel and large mackerel. The group labelled “small mackerel” 
is taken as the baseline, and the following dummy variable is introduced:
where w = Med, Lar represents medium and large sizes, respectively.
Looking at the disaggregated data by port, some differences in prices can be ob-
served. Thus, it seems to be interesting the introduction of a dummy variable repre-
senting the port where the fish is landed and auctioned:
8 The AZTI fishery database records information on landings according to sizes that are based on logbooks and 
sales notes. An analysis to classify fish into these three categories was performed by AZTI biologists on the basis 
of that information.
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where the port of  Bermeo is taken as the baseline, and z = Don, Get, Hon, Lek, Ond re-
presents the ports of Donostia, Getaria, Hondarribia, Lekeitio and Ondarroa, respectively. 
All the variables, except the dummies, are expressed in logs, enabling the co-
efficients to be interpreted as elasticities and reducing the problems that would be 
caused by any potential heteroscedasticity. However, evidence of heteroscedasticity 
is still found in some of the models specified in this study, so an heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimate of the variance and covariance matrix of the estimators of the co-
efficients is used to enable inferences to be drawn based on Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). Thus, regressions of the log of prices on an intercept, the log of quantities 
and a number of dummy variables representing the fishing techniques, fish size and 
port where mackerel is landed and auctioned were conducted. In order to allow for 
elasticities changing with the fishing technique, we also introduced the interactions 
between the log of quantities and the different fishing techniques. Finally, as mac-
kerel is caught mainly during a specific period of the year referred to as the “fishing 
season”, it seems appropriate to introduce a variable to reflect the differences in mar-
ket behaviour expected during the fishing season compared with the rest of the year. 
This effect is factored in through the interaction between the log of quantities and the 
following dummy variable: 
in which the fishing season is considered to last from February 1 to April 20 (AZTI 
fishery database)9.
This gives rise to the following model to be estimated: 
Quantities for possible substitute goods of the kind traditionally employed in 
studies of this type are not included here because, as per García-Enríquez (2012), 
mackerel has no substitutes in the market. In particular, after carrying out a fractional 
cointegration analysis among historical price series of mackerel and other small pe-
lagic fishes (sardine, chub mackerel and horse mackerel), the author concludes that 
prices of the mackerel landed and auctioned at Basque ports are not related to the 
ones of the other considered species. This means, among others, that buyers at origin 
do not consider substitutes of this species. 
9 These dates were taken for the fishing season after careful observation of landings in 2007. Other periods were 
also tested, but the results did not vary.
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Likewise García-Enríquez et al. (2014) study the horizontal relationships among 
the different Spanish regional markets of mackerel at origin: Basque Country, Can-
tabria, Asturias, Galicia and Andalusia by means of fractional cointegration techni-
ques. The results show that the price creation process of one market does not affect 
the others, but they are instead linearly independent and produced at local level. 
Thus, geographically speaking, the existence of five independent regional mackerel 
markets in Spain (one for each region) can be established. On the other hand, supply 
usually exceeds demand in the Basque mackerel market at origin. In fact, there exists 
a freezer owned by the fishermen which buys the mackerel that cannot be sold in the 
market due to the low demand (or when the sale price is lower than a particular mini-
mum price). Then this fish is usually exported to the East Europe markets -Romania 
and Bulgaria mainly- but not for direct consumption but to be processed and used in 
the elaboration of other goods such as flour. Due to all these reasons we decide not to 
consider the inclusion of imports as explanatory variable of prices.
Other variables that could be relevant in explaining price formation, such as the 
order in which the batches of landed mackerel are auctioned, are not included be-
cause no information on them is collected by any organisation.
Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics for the variables price and quantity, 
which can be helpful to understand the model. The statistics are calculated at a di-
saggregated level, considering all the different technique/size and port/size combi-
nations. The first line of each cell represents the main statistics (mean, median and 
standard deviation) for price and the second one (between round brackets) the same 
for quantity. The number of observations (first column of each cell) is obviously 
common for both price and quantity variables. In general terms it is observed that 
average price and quantity increases as fish size does, although there are exceptions 
due to some large standard deviations, so the medians are also of interest. Looking 
at the total figures by technique, purse seiners are the ones with the largest average 
landings and the smallest prices, whereas the lowest average quantity is reached by 
gillnets and biggest average prices by coastal trawls. Regarding ports, the interest 
lies especially on the differences in total average price and quantity. As it can be 
observed there are no differences in average prices among Getaria, Hondarribia and 
Lekeitio, being Donostia, Ondarroa and Bermeo the ports with the highest prices. 
The order in terms of average landings is completely different, with Donostia being 
the smallest and Getaria the largest.
Table 3 shows the results for the estimation of the proposed model. The fit shows 
that all variables are individually significant except for the ports of Donostia and Onda-
rroa. However, it was decided not to exclude them so as to give a complete picture of 
all the different ports. Evidence against the homoscedasticity hypothesis was observed 
(typical testing procedures such as White and Breusch-Pagan tests reject the null hypo-
thesis of homoscedasticity with p-values < 0.0001), so a heteroscedasticity robust esti-
mation of the standard deviations of the OLS estimator was used. As far as goodness of 
fit is concerned, the model explains 60.75 % of the total variability of the log of prices.
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TABLE 3 
OLS estimate of inverse demand function
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard deviation p-value
Constant -0.0531 0.1114 0.6338
ln (qi) -0.1397 0.0109 < 0.0001
PSi -0.8777 0.1008 < 0.0001
Gii -0.6434 0.1617 < 0.0001
Tri -1.1346 0.2695 < 0.0001
CTri -0.3601 0.1316 0.0062
Medi 0.9280 0.1037 <0.0001
Lari 1.1173 0.0934 < 0.0001
Doni -0.0675 0.0697 0.33276
Geti -0.1446 0.0300 < 0.0001
Honi -0.2500 0.0354 < 0.0001
Leki -0.4186 0.0305 < 0.0001
Ondi -0.0071 0.0230 0.7562
ln (qi) Seasi -0.0967 0.0050 < 0.0001
ln (qi) PSi 0.0986 0.0112 < 0.0001
ln (qi) Gii 0.1027 0.0363 0.0047
ln (qi) Tri 0.1809 0.0448 < 0.0001
ln (qi) CTri 0.1094 0.0172 < 0.0001
Source: Own elaboration.
An interpretation of the model follows, with explanations of how expected prices 
vary in reaction to changes in the different variables:
Quantity (elasticity of demand –  –)10. The estimated elasticity ( ) depends on 
the fishing technique and the season as follows:
 .
The elasticities therefore vary in line with the fishing technique and the season. 
For instance Table 4 shows the different elasticities during the fishing season toge-
ther with the p-value associated with the tests of significance.
10 Note that since the inverse function is used instead of the demand function, the elasticities are interpreted 
as responses on the part of the prices that purchasers are willing to pay in reaction to changes in the quantities 
demanded.
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TABLE 4
Estimated elasticities ( ) per fishing technique during the fishing season
p-value
Hand lines -0.1397 - 0.0967 = -0.2364 < 0.0001
Purse seiners -0.1397 - 0.0967 + 0.0980 = -0.1378 < 0.0001
Gillnets -0.1397 - 0.0967 + 0.1027 = -0.1337 0.0002
Trawlers -0.1397 - 0.0967 + 0.1809 = -0.0555 0.2065
Coastal trawlers -0.1397 - 0.0967 + 0.1094 = -0.1270 < 0.0001
Source: Own elaboration.
Taking into account the results of the tests of significance at 5 % for the different 
price elasticities, it can be asserted that during the fishing season an increase of 1 % 
in the quantity demanded results in a fall in price for all techniques except trawlers, 
for which prices are unaffected by the quantity of fish landed. Specifically, there are 
falls of 0.24 % for hand lines, 0.14 % for purse seiners, 0.13 % for gillnets and 0.13% 
for coastal trawlers. However the number of observations for gillnets and trawlers is 
very low, so the results for these fishing techniques should be regarded with caution. 
Fishing season. The fishing season effect depends on quantity and takes the form 
of a price drop during the fishing season of 0.10 % for each percentage point of in-
crease in the quantity demanded. The fact that prices are lower during the fishing sea-
son than during the off-season for the same quantities is probably due to the fact that 
the possibility of purchasing elsewhere (i.e. changing sellers) is far greater during the 
fishing season. Moreover, purchasers know that there will be mackerel available on 
the market during the fishing season, so not purchasing on a particular day poses no 
problems because they know that they will be able to purchase again very shortly.
Fishing technique. The effect of the fishing techniques depends on the quantity 
due to the interactions included in the model. Thus, taking the price for hand lines as 
the baseline, expected prices for purse seiners, gillnets, trawlers and coastal trawlers 
are: (-0.88 + 0.10 ln qi) x 100 %, (-0.64 + 0.10 ln qi) x 100 %, (-1.13 + 0.18 ln qi) x 
100 % and (-0.36 + 0.11 ln qi) x 100 % lower. As it can be observed, there are two 
effects to be considered here: The first term of each expression is always negative 
and does not depend on the quantity; the second term, however, is always positive 
and increases with quantity. Thus, although hand lines obtain the highest price in ge-
neral, this must not be the case for large quantities. The effects on the demand curve 
of the two main fishing techniques during the fishing season, which is the most sig-
nificant period, are shown below (Graph 1). The graph shows the data for the “large 
mackerel” size, the most usual one, and the port of Bermeo, but its structure would 
be similar for other size groups and ports in view of the constant ratio of elasticity to 
size and ports. As it can be observed, the price for fish caught by purse seines only 
exceeds that of catches made with lines when the batch size is greater than 6,600 kg. 
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Taking into account that more than the 80 % of the batches landed by lines are sma-
ller in size than 6,600 kg, it can be concluded that the price paid for fish caught with 
lines is usually higher than for catches made with purse seiners. This is probably be-
cause purchasers perceive line-caught fish as being of higher quality due to the way 
in which the fish is treated during the fishing operations themselves and when being 
handled on-board vessels.
GRAPH 1
Estimated demand functions for hand lines and purse seiners 
during the fishing season
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Size. The expected prices of “medium-sized” and “large” mackerel are 93 % and 
112 % higher respectively than the expected price of the “small” group. These figures 
indicate that the larger the fish is, the higher the prices that purchasers are willing to 
pay. 
Port. First, the expected prices at ports of Getaria, Hondarribia and Lekeitio are 
14 % lower, 25 % lower and 42 % lower, respectively, than the expected price at Ber-
meo port. Second, looking at the p-values associated with the ports of Donostia and 
Ondarroa, there is no evidence of differences between the expected prices at these 
ports and at Bermeo port.
3.1.1. Effects of Management on the Fishery
This subsection uses the estimated demand function to analyse the effects of in-
troducing a daily limit in terms of fleet profitability. From 2008 to 2010 a daily limit 
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per fisherman was set on catches with the intention of preventing the daily market 
from being flooded and thus raising prices. Our objective here is to check whether 
that measure enables profitability to be increased on the basis of a lower volume of 
catches and whether it influences the daily market price. To that end, the regulations 
applicable in 2010 are considered. 
If a similar limit to that applied in 2010 had been in force in 2007, catches would 
have totalled just over 18,000 tonnes, i.e. around 74 % of the volume actually landed 
that year11. Limits for hand lines and gillnets are set according to the number of fisher-
men –with the average figures being 7 and 4 respectively (AZTI)–. The calculations 
for purse seiners did not take into account the fact that the regulations allow catches to 
be accumulated under certain conditions12. A comparison between the actual catches 
landed in 2007 (in tonnes) and those that would have been permitted under the daily 
limits applicable in 2010 reveals that the quantities caught by purse seiners and hand 
lines with the limits would have been 39 % lower and 11 % lower, respectively. The 
decrease for the other fishing techniques would have been less than 4 % in all cases.
The average price of mackerel (per fishing technique and per fishing season) in 
2007 (without daily limit regulation) is compared below with the average price resul-
ting from the inverse demand function under the daily limits system. By way of exam-
ple, Table 5 shows the results for the “large mackerel” size group and for the port of 
Bermeo. The figures obtained for other sizes and ports are qualitatively similar.
Outside the fishing season, the only variation in the price per kg is in the mackerel 
landed by the purse-seine fleet, where there is an increase of around one eurocent. 
The price of mackerel caught with other types of gear remains the same, as they are 
unaffected by daily limits. During the fishing season, purse-seiners and hand-lines are 
the most affected techniques by the daily limits system: The prices of catches made 
with these techniques increase between one and a half and two eurocents per kg. The 
price paid for mackerel caught by coastal trawlers, landings which are on average 
slightly greater than the maximum permitted under the daily limits, also increases, by 
around a third of a eurocent. Finally, there would be no changes in price for mackerel 
caught with trawls and gillnets, since daily limits are not exceeded in these fishing 
techniques. Thus, the effect on prices (and therefore on profitability) of introducing 
a daily limit would have been zero (or practically zero) for trawlers, coastal trawlers 
and gillnet vessels, and would have been very limited for purse-seiners and hand-line 
vessels. It is without doubt the purse-seine fleet the one that would be affected most 
by the daily limits system, since it catches more than its limit during and outside the 
11 The daily quotas per fishing technique for 2010 were as follows: 18,000 kg/day for individual bottom trawls 
(36,000 kg/day for pair trawls); 18,000 kg/day for purse seiners with GT over 100 t; 9,000 kg/day for purse 
seiners with GT below 100 t (with those whose GT was less than 50 t being limited to 700 kg/day in the second 
half of the year); and 100 kg/fisherman/day for lines and gillnets.
12 Should bad weather prevent vessels using this fishing technique from setting sail due to their special charac-
teristics on certain working days within the same week, they will be allowed to add the quantities not caught to 
their catches on the remaining days of that week, in line with the daily quota established, but vessels with a GT 
of more than 100 t may in no case exceed 90,000 kg per vessel per week and those with a GT of less than 100 t 
may not exceed 45,000 kg per vessel per week (Orden ARM/271/2010).
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fishing season. Under the daily limits system, this fleet would have had to reduce its 
catches by almost 40 %, which would have resulted in price increases of up to 2 or 1 
eurocents per kg, depending on the time period. As an example, in Table 6 the ave-
rage revenues per vessel (in euros) that purse-seiners, hand lines and coastal trawlers 
would have obtained in fishing season with daily limits and without them are pre-
sented. This serves to justify the strategy adopted by fishermen of catching as much 
as possible. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows that in those fishing seasons 
for which daily limits were actually imposed (2008-2010) their effect on prices was 
practically zero (AZTI fishery database). This provides empirical corroboration of 
the results of the analysis conducted here for 2007.
TABLE 5
Average daily catches (in kg) per vessel with no daily limits and with daily li-
mits & associated prices (in euros) per fishing technique
In fishing season
kg w/o limits €/kg w/o limits kg w limits €/kg w limits Price increase
Hand-lines 3,872 0.4014 3,312 0.4167 0.0153
Purse seiners 13,330 0.3199 8,514 0.3406 0.0207
Gillnets 105 0.8013 105 0.8013 0
Trawlers 1,319 0.6120 1,319 0.6120 0
Coastal trawlers 7,677 0.6357 7,350 0.6393 0.0036
Outside fishing season
kg w/o limits €/kg w/o limits kg w limits €/kg w limits Price increase
Hand-lines 233 1.3591 233 1.3591 0
Purse seiners 416 0.9501 314 0.9608 0.0107
Gillnets 23 1.3561 23 1.3561 0
Trawlers 1,777 1.2704 1,769 1.2701 -0.0003
Coastal trawlers 1,343 1.6387 1,343 1.6387 0
Source: Own elaboration.
TABLE 6 
Average daily revenues (in euros) per vessel with no daily limits and with daily 
limits per fishing technique
 Revenues w/o limits Revenues w limits Revenues increase
Hand-lines 1,554.27 1,380.27 -174
Purse seiners 4,264.52 2,900.22 -1,364.3
Coastal trawlers 4,880.52 4,699.15 -181.37
Source: Own elaboration.
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3.2. Empirical Specification and Estimation of Cost Function
Information on the annual costs of the vessels involved in the fishing season for 
mackerel is obtained from numerous sources –mainly the Basque government and 
the fishing industry– and is available from AZTI. As pointed out before, the number 
of vessels taking part in this fishery during 2007 was 235. However, there is no costs 
information in all of them because that information is obtained by means of an annual 
survey that the Basque government conducts among a sample of vessels. Thus, in 
2007 the number of vessels that having landed mackerel answered the survey was 74. 
An analysis of the cost structure of vessels brings to light three main headings: a) 
personnel costs; b) fuel costs and c) other maintenance and repair costs.
The demand function estimated for 2007 uses daily data and it was therefore deci-
ded to also estimate a daily cost function for that year. However, surveys conducted 
to obtain cost data are made on an annual basis. Calculations are therefore required to 
determine what part of the total costs can be attributed to the mackerel fishing season, 
since most Basque vessels work in a number of different metiers during the year and 
therefore they also land species other than mackerel (for example the Basque artisa-
nal fleet may land as many as 60 different species in a year).
Costs are allocated to the mackerel fishing season via the application of a number 
of criteria set out by Prellezo (2011). First, the different expense items (around 30) 
are classified as follows: (1) personnel costs associated with payments to crewmen 
(dependent on catches); (2) personnel costs not involving payments to crewmen (not 
dependent on catches); (3) variable costs; (4) fixed costs13 and (5) fuel costs14.
Once items have been classified the following criteria are applied:
i. For items dependent on catches (items 1 and 3) the percentage allocated to 
the fishing season is the percentage of total revenue from fishing accounted 
for by this species. 
ii. For items not dependent on catches (items 2 and 4) the percentage allocated 
to the fishing season is the percentage of the total fishing season for the year 
(in months) accounted for by the fishing season for this species (in months)15.
iii. For fuel (item 5) the allocation is based on applying criterion ii to each ves-
sel, then the resulting figures weighted according to the percentage of total 
landings of all species accounted for by mackerel landings during the fishing 
season (February 1 - April 20).
13 The fixed costs we refer to are of annual frequency, such as insurance premia, port fees, licenses… They are 
different from the variable costs because they do not depend on catches, but they also should be included in the 
estimation of the cost function.
14 Prellezo (2011) includes a sixth item called “cofradía” costs, but it was decided to subsume this into “variable 
costs” as it depends partly on catches. “Cofradía” is the term used to refer to the fishermen organizations in the 
Basque Country. Fishermen must pay a cost to their “cofradía”, which depends partly on catches.
15  The fishing season lasts 3 months (February, March and April) and a count of the number of months during 
that time when each vessel sets out to catch mackerel is made. The figure used is therefore 1, 2 or 3, depending 
on each vessel.
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This provides information on total costs during the fishing season for mackerel, 
and breaks down that information into the three main headings indicated above: Per-
sonnel costs (the sum of items 1 and 2), fuel costs (item 5) and other maintenance and 
repair costs (the sum of items 3 and 4). These costs can then be divided by the fishing 
effort (measured here in terms of the number of tides) to obtain the daily costs asso-
ciated with the mackerel fishing season16.
A single cost equation is estimated since not enough observations are available 
for distinctions between techniques to be drawn (after dropping the observations of 
those vessels whose mackerel landings were residual the final number of observa-
tions is 58). However, the main differences in cost between techniques usually arise 
in the quantity of fuel consumed, and this mainly depends in turn on the size and 
power of each vessel. For that reason the fuel price index calculated below takes the 
length and power of each vessel into account.
Cost items are expressed below in line with the variables quantity, prices and 
the price of the different production inputs (following Bjørndal and Gordon, 2001; 
Nøstbakken, 2006; Lazkano, 2008 among others). In particular, the following defini-
tions are used to obtain price and quantity indices for the three major cost headings 
identified above:
1) Personnel costs.
a) Proxy for quantity: Average number of full-time crewmen.
b) Proxy for price: Personnel cost divided by the average number of full-
time fishermen, i.e. the cost of hiring one fisherman for one day during 
the mackerel fishing season.
2) Fuel costs.
a) Proxy for quantity: The method proposed by Lazkano (2008) is used, 
i.e. power0.5 length0.5, with power measured in horsepower and length in 
metres.
b) Proxy for price:  .
3) Other maintenance and repair costs (“other costs”).
a) Proxy for quantity: Average daily catch during the fishing season.
b) Proxy for price: Other costs divided by the average daily catch during 
the fishing season (in kg), i.e. the cost of catching one kg of mackerel in 
terms of “other costs”.
16 There are only residual landings outside the fishing season. In 2007 they accounted for around 4 % of the total.
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Once the production input price indices are calculated, the next step is to specify 
the functional form to be estimated. The form that is conventionally most widely 
used is the trans-logarithmic form, due to its great flexibility (see, for instance, Tran 
and Smith, 1983; Bjørndal and Gordon, 2001; Morgenstern et al., 2002; Nøstbakken, 
2006 or Lazkano, 2008). Thus, the model to be estimated is the following:
[2]
where, for a vessel i, ci is the cost per kg caught, p1i , p2i and p3i are the price indices 
for personnel, fuel and other maintenance and repair costs, respectively, and qi is the 
average daily quantity landed.
If the underlying cost function is continuous, as per the Young Theorem17, then it 
must hold that , so the number of parameters of [2] decreases in this case 
from 18 to 15.
In all cases the cost function must fulfil the following properties: It must be (i) 
first-degree homogenous in prices; (ii) non-decreasing in input prices; (iii) concave; 
and (iv) continuous in prices. The case under study here uses an average cost function 
rather than a cost function, but a check that all these properties are fulfilled on the 
average cost curve guarantees that they are also fulfilled on the total cost curve.
Property (i) is usually imposed on the model by means of the following constraints:
while fulfilment of the remaining properties is checked on the model estimated18.
Using Shephard’s lemma (Shephard, 1953) the equations for the optimal factor 
demand equations or factor share equations (s1, s2 y s3) can be obtained from the cost 
function19:
[3]
17 The Young Theorem states that if a function f (x1, x2,..., xn) has continuous second partial derivatives at any 
given point, say (a1, a2,..., an), then:   for every i, j = 1, 2,...,n.
18 The property of continuity can be checked straightforwardly. The function in question is logarithmic, so it is 
known to be continuous throughout its domain, i.e. for all strictly positive prices.
19 Shephard’s lemma states that the conditional factor demand for each input factor is equal to the derivative of 
the cost function with respect to the factor price.
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[4]
[5]
Given the link between the cost equation and the share equations, the disturbances 
in equations [2], [3], [4] and [5] can be expected to be related, so the usual practice in 
the relevant literature is to consider them as a system of seemingly unrelated regres-
sion equations (SURE). However, taking into account that the shares of the factors 
add up to one, a joint estimation of all four equations results in singularity in the joint 
variance and covariance matrix of the disturbances, and one of the share equations is 
therefore excluded from the system. The demand equation excluded here is the one 
for “other maintenance and repair costs”, i.e. [5], though if any other had been exclu-
ded instead the results would not be altered provided that estimations are made with 
maximum likelihood or using iterated Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), 
which converges to maximum likelihood. In this study, the second option is selected 
and consistent estimators are obtained which are relatively more efficient than those 
that would be obtained from OLS estimation of a model formed solely by [2].
Table 7 shows the results for estimating equation [2], performed as described 
above. All the parameters estimated are found to be significant at 5 % except for the 
cross product of the log of quantity and the log of fuel price. And it is also worth no-
ting that the signs of the coefficients are as predicted by economic theory. Specifica-
lly, the average costs are increasing with input prices (property (ii)), decreasing with 
catches up to a certain quantity and increasing thereafter. In particular, the partial 
derivative of ln ci with regard to ln qi is
However, the decreasing section dominates because a substantial proportion of 
the total costs are fixed costs. This prevents the estimated average cost function from 
taking a clear U-shape. 
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TABLE 7
Estimate of average cost function
Variable Parameter estimate Standard deviation p-value
Constant 1.2829 0.4038 0.0028
ln P1i 0.3218 0.0702 < 0.0001
ln P2i 0.3570 0.0826 < 0.0001
ln P3i 0.3212 0.0616 < 0.0001
ln qi -0.4369 0.1071 0.0002
ln P1i ln P1i 0.1714 0.0113 < 0.0001
ln P1i ln P2i -0.0589 0.0102 < 0.0001
ln P1i ln P3i -0.1125 0.0074 < 0.0001
ln P2i ln P2i 0.1091 0.0125 < 0.0001
ln P2i ln P3i -0.0502 0.0073 < 0.0001
ln P3i ln P3i 0.1627 0.0079 < 0.0001
ln P1i ln qi -0.0933 0.0094 < 0.0001
ln P2i ln qi -0.0162 0.0105 0.1311
ln P3i ln qi 0.1095 0.0095 < 0.0001
ln2 qi 0.0778 0.0156 < 0.0001
Source: Own elaboration.
For the average cost function to be concave in prices (property (iii)) it suffices for 
the Hessian matrix (H) to be negative semi-definite. Following Diewert and Wales 
(1987), this matrix is calculated. Since the dispersion relative to the arithmetic mean 
of prices is wide, H is evaluated at the median values20. The relevant operations result 
in singular values of H of -0.1381, -0.0019 and 0.0000, so the matrix can be conside-
red as negative semi-definite and the concavity of the cost function is assured.
Graph 2 shows the average and marginal cost functions estimated for the same 
range of quantities used for the demand function (between 0 and 50,000 kg) and 
where prices have been evaluated at their respective median values. As can be seen, 
the function is decreasing for this range of catches. As a result, the strategy followed 
by fishermen of maximising revenue through catches also maximises profit. The 
efficient level of production, defined as that which minimises average production 
costs, is attained with landings of 5,368 t. For that volume of landings, the average 
cost should be equal to the marginal cost. It seems clear that the fishery is operating 
within a range of catches which is always below the effective production level defi-
ned. This means that the fishing operations of each vessel are located to the left of the 
minimum average cost. Thus, fishing operations are carried out in an area where the 
average and marginal cost curves are decreasing, with the marginal cost being lower 
20 The geometric mean was also tried, not affecting the conclusions.
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than the average cost. This strongly conditions the strategies that can be followed to 
improve profitability, because economic equilibrium is unattainable, regardless of the 
relationship between the demand and average cost curves (which is analysed below). 
It is therefore not possible to estimate a reference price relative to efficient, environ-
mentally sustainable production.
GRAPH 2
Estimated average cost (ci) and marginal cost (cmg) functions
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3.3. Economic Equilibrium 
This subsection analyses the economic equilibrium of activity based on the de-
mand and cost curves estimated. It incorporates the concept of income, defined here 
on the basis of the profit obtained from the operation of each vessel (Price × Catches 
- Average Cost × Catches). The analysis takes into account the biological reference 
points derived from the biological model estimated by the ICES Working Group on 
Widely Distributed Stocks (WGWIDE).
Although access to the mackerel fishery is regulated, fishermen behave indivi-
dually, maximising their revenue without considering the situation of the stock or the 
performance of the fleet as a whole, i.e. as if there were free access. Considering a 
bio-economic model, Holland (2008) stresses that a profit maximising strategy may 
be more of a collective behaviour pattern (fishermen form part of a group) than an 
individual one. 
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In the case of the mackerel fishery, this behaviour could be explained in terms 
of the result set out above: Landings are located to the left of the minimum average 
cost, which makes not possible to reach an economic equilibrium. The strategy in the 
specific case of purse-seine vessels is also implemented because of their high fishing 
capacity. For hand-line vessels, which can obtain better prices and are therefore able 
to manage catches more suitably, the strategy adopted is ultimately conditioned by 
what purse-seine vessels do, so such vessels also find it optimal to maximise catches. 
GRAPH 3
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Source: Own elaboration.
Although there is no question of attaining an economically efficient equilibrium or, 
therefore, a socially efficient equilibrium, it is still useful to analyse the gap between 
prices and costs at least to learn how profitable this fishery is for the particular analy-
sed situation. Thus, Graph 3 and Graph 4 show examples of the estimated average cost 
function (Ci) and the estimated inverse demand function (Pi) during the fishing season 
for the most widely used fishing techniques, i.e. hand lines and purse seiners, respecti-
vely. It can be seen that the cost of mackerel per kg is higher than the price per kg paid 
to fishermen for the lowest quantities. However, the gap narrows as the quantities lan-
ded increase, and is positive when catches are above 16,000 kg for purse seiners and 
above 26,600 kg for hand lines. Regarding hand lines technique, it should be taken 
into account that in 2007 only one vessel landed more than 26,600 kg in one day, 
so the economic equilibrium is associated with a level of exploitation of stocks that 
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is certainly not sustainable. Meanwhile, the quantity for which the average cost and 
demand curves intersect in the case of purse seiners can be considered plausible, even 
though it is large. For gillnets, costs begin to fall below the level of prices when daily 
landings exceed around 8,000 kg. However, in 2007 no gillnet vessel landed more 
than 2,000 kg. For trawlers the intersection of the demand and cost functions is located 
at around 5,000 kg, and it is around 3,200 kg for coastal trawlers, and so it seems that 
these techniques are able to work this fishery more profitably than the others.
GRAPH 4
Average cost function (ci) vs demand function (pi) for purse seiners
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4. Discussion 
The structure of the demand and cost functions plays an important role when 
explaining the “race” of fishermen to increase catches. They are willing to conti-
nue catching as much fish as possible even at the risk of overexploiting the species. 
Indeed, this situation has led the Basque fleet alone to land catches in excess of the 
TAC allocated to the whole of Spain. However, this attitude is not specific to the 
Basque mackerel fishing fleet: The European Commission itself has raised the issue 
on more than one occasion. Moreover, it must be stressed that it is the market itself 
that forces fishermen to resort to bigger catches to make their operations profitable. 
Empirical evidence from the mackerel selling market in Basque ports indicates that 
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a lack of openness in the market, the fragmentation of the sector and the high level 
of concentration in demand seem to be conditioning the ex-vessel prices of the fish 
caught by this fleet. Indeed, the high concentration of purchasers suggests that there 
could well be non-competitive behaviour (Prellezo et al., 2010; Mugerza et al., 2011; 
Murillas et al., 2012). 
However, the behaviour of fishermen cannot be explained exclusively on the basis 
of solving an economic problem of income maximisation, since there are numerous 
key drivers that need to be incorporated into empirical models if the dynamics of the 
fleets and the behaviour of fishermen themselves are to be understood (Putten et al., 
2011). For example, Hannesson (1998) stresses that institutional factors, such as the 
rigidity of the system for allocating TACs, lead in themselves to a race to catch stocks.
To sum up, a system of daily limits seems unlikely in itself to be able to solve the 
problems of low profitability suffered by the fishing industry. This paper does not 
intend to attribute exclusively to the structure of the demand and the cost functions 
the lack of success of the adopted management measures, or the low profitability of 
the Basque fleet. Other potential drivers could compromise the profitability, such 
as the possible overcapacity of the fleet which characterises many European fleets 
(COM/2015/563; COM/2014/233; COM/2013/85). In this sense, the latest reform of 
the Common Fisheries Policy envisaged the introduction of a system of individual, 
transferable rights in Member States as an instrument for reducing the overcapacity 
of fishing fleets (for vessels whose total length exceeds 12 m, although the Common 
Fishery Policy which came into force in January 2014 relaxed the 12 m requirement)21.
The target set is a reduction in the size of the fleet that will depend, among other 
aspects, on its ability to generate revenue. A possible reduction in the number of 
vessels could help to improve the economic situation of the Basque fleet, but it could 
also reduce the number of jobs on board vessels, meaning that it would not help to 
achieve sustainability from a social perspective (Murillas et al., 2012). 
Finally, it is worth noting that European Commission has imposed two fines on 
the Spanish fleet: One for having exceeded its TAC in 2010 (forcing it to a adjust 
catches up to 2015) and the other one for having exceeded its TAC in 2009 (forcing it 
to adjust catches from 2016 onwards). The lack of responsibility of fishery managers 
in that previous period is now seriously harming legitimate interests and for the sus-
tainable future of the mackerel fisheries.
5. Conclusions
This paper provides an economic analysis of the equilibrium of the mackerel fishery 
developed by Basque fleets. This stock is exploited by international fleets; however 
Spain holds around the 80 % of the total TAC allocated for the South area, with the 
Basque fleet being the largest one fishing for mackerel from home ports in Spain. 
Both inshore and offshore sub-sectors contribute to the exploitation, although higher 
amounts of mackerel are landed by hand-lines, purse seiners and bottom trawlers.
21 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/proposals/index_en.htm.
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The growing interest in reducing catches and influencing the behaviour of fisher-
men has led to the introduction of changes in the management of this fishery, in a 
situation that can be extrapolated to other European fisheries. 2008 was a key year 
in terms of the management of the national fishery from an economic point of view, 
given that a new regulation based on daily limits was then introduced to affect the 
economic component of the fishing activity. In particular, it was expected to produce 
economic incentives through pushing up the ex-vessels prices. Thus, 2007 is chosen 
to analyse the economic structure of the fishing activity, which provides important 
insights to understand the degree of successful of the aforementioned regulation.
Given the empirical fishermen´s behaviour, which is characterised by following 
a volume-maximising strategy rather than attending to market consideration, this 
study considers the inverse-demand function assuming the supply is completely 
inelastic and does not react to price. Differences in price are most due to the fish 
size, the technology employed and the landed port, all of them factored by means of 
dummy variables into the function. The estimated inverse demand function shows a 
high level of elasticity, so it is only possible to achieve slight increases in price at the 
expense of substantial reductions in supply, implemented through significant decrea-
ses in catches. As shown in this paper, if catches are limited by a daily limit system, 
the average income obtained by fishermen would drop substantially. Combined with 
the fact that the average costs of the fleet decrease with the quantity of catches, this 
would mean major losses for the sector. 
The cost-structure of vessels is built based on three main headings: Personnel, 
fuel and other maintenance and repair costs. The average and marginal cost functions 
are decreasing for the range of landed quantities, that is, fishing activity is located 
to the left of the minimum average cost. This justifies the fishermen´s behaviour of 
maximising revenues through catches because this behaviour also implies maximi-
sing profits. Finally, it should be noted that depending on the level of exploitation, 
this fishery could reach an economic equilibrium but not always at sustainable levels.
The simulations carried out in this study show that daily limits need to be ac-
companied by changes in the demand function, because selling prices will not cover 
average costs if everything remains the same. Although it remains to be seen what 
will happen in the coming years, for the moment the economic sustainability of the 
fleet cannot be seen as guaranteed.
References
Asche, F. and Hannesson, R. (2002). “Allocation of fish between markets and pro-
ducts forms”. Marine Resource Economics, 17(3): 225-238.
Barten, A.P. and Bettendorf, L.J. (1989). “Price formation of fish: An application 
of an inverse demand system”. European Economic Review, 33(8): 1509-1525. 
http://doi.org/ddrjmg.
Economic structure of fishing activity: An analysis of mackerel... 107
Bjørndal, T. and Gordon, D.V. (2001). “The economic structure of harvesting for 
three vessel types in Norwegian spring-spawning herring fishery”. Marine Re-
source Economics, 15(4): 281-292.
COM/2013/85. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on Member States’ efforts during 2011 to achieve a sustainable ba-
lance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities. Available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/fishing_effort/index_es.htm. Last ac-
cess: February 2016.
COM/2014/233. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on Member States’ efforts during 2012 to achieve a sustainable ba-
lance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities. Available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/fishing_effort/index_es.htm. Last ac-
cess: February 2016.
COM/2015/563. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on Member States’ efforts during 2013 to achieve a sustainable ba-
lance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities. Available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/fishing_effort/index_es.htm. Last ac-
cess: February 2016.
Diewert, W.E. and Wales, T.J. (1987). “Flexible functional forms and global curva-
ture conditions”. Econometrica, 55(1): 43-68. http://doi.org/fqj73h.
Eales, J., Durham, C. and Wessells, C.R. (1997). “Generalized models of Japanese 
demand for fish”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79(4): 1153-1163.
García-Enríquez, J. (2012). Análisis de rentabilidad de la pesquería del verdel y su 
mercado en el País Vasco: un enfoque econométrico. PhD.diss. Department of 
Econometrics and Statistics, University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU.
García-Enríquez, J., Hualde, J., Arteche, J. and Murillas, A. (2014). “Spatial integra-
tion in the Spanish mackerel market”. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 65(1): 
234-256. http://doi.org/bdk8.
Gorman, W.M. (1959). The demand for fish, an application of factor analysis. Re-
search Paper Nº6 Series A, University of Birmingham, Birmingham.
Hannesson, R. (1998). “The role of economic tools in redefining fisheries manage-
ment.” In T.J. Pitcher, P. Hart and D. Pauly (Eds.): Reinventing fisheries manage-
ment. Kluwer Academic publishers, London: 251-260.
Herrmann, M. and Criddle, K. (2006). “An econometric market model for the Pacific 
halibut fishery”. Marine Resource Economics, 21(2): 129-158.
Holland, D.S. (2008). “Are fishermen rational? A fishing expedition”. Marine Re-
source Economics, 23(3): 325-344. http://doi.org/bdk9.
Huang, K.S. (1988). “An inverse demand system for U.S. composite foods”. Ameri-
can Journal of Agricultural Economics, 70(4): 903-909.
108  García-Enríquez, J.; Murillas-Maza, A. and Arteche, J.
ICES. (2010). Report of the Working Group on Widely Distributed Stocks 
(WGWIDE). ICES CM 2010/ACOM:15. Available at: http://www.ices.dk/
sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Expert%20Group%20Report/acom/2010/
WGWIDE/WGWIDE%202010.pdf. Last access: February 2016.  
ICES. (2012). Report of the Working Group on Widely Distributed Stocks 
(WGWIDE). ICES CM 2012/ACOM:15. Available at: http://www.ices.dk/
sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Expert%20Group%20Report/acom/2012/
WGWIDE/WGWIDE%202012.pdf. Last access: February 2016.
ICES. (2015). ICES Advice on fishing opportunities, catch, and effort. ICES Advice 
2015, Book 9. Available at: http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Re-
ports/Advice/2015/2015/mac-nea.pdf. Last access: February 2016.
Lazkano, I. (2008). “Cost structure and capacity utilisation in multi-product indus-
tries: an application to the Basque trawl industry”. Environmental and Resource 
Economics, 41(2): 189-207. http://doi.org/fp5zq6.
Morgenstern, R.D., Pizer, W.A. and Shih, J.S. (2002). “Jobs versus the environment: 
an industry-level perspective”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Mana-
gement, 43(3): 412-436. http://doi.org/cxg9kg.
Mugerza, E., Murillas, A., Arregi, L., Alzorriz, N. and Artetxe, I. (2011). La base 
del conocimiento para la gestión eficiente de la flota artesanal vasca. Technical 
report drawn up by AZTI for the Federation of Fishing Guilds of Gipuzkoa (Suka-
rrieta, Spain).
Murillas, A., Mugerza, E., Arregi, L., Alzorriz, N. and Artetxe, I. (2012). “Desarrollo 
sostenible de las pesquerías artesanales del País Vasco”. Colección Itsaso, 42. 
Servicio Central de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco, Vitoria, Spain.
Nøstbakken, L. (2006). “Cost structure and capacity in the Norwegian pelagic fishe-
ries”. Applied Economics, 38(6): 1877-1887. http://doi.org/fpshgg.
Orden ARM/2091/2008, de 8 de julio, por la que se regulan las capturas y desembar-
ques de caballa del Caladero Nacional del Cantábrico y Noroeste. BOE, July 15, 
2008. 
Orden ARM/271/2010, de 10 de febrero, por la que se establecen los criterios para el 
reparto y la gestión de la cuota de caballa, y se regula su captura y desembarque. 
BOE, February 13, 2010.
Orden ARM/1054/2010, de 23 de abril, por la que se modifica la Orden 
ARM/271/2010, de 10 de febrero, por la que se establecen los criterios para el 
reparto y la gestión de la cuota de caballa y se regula su captura y desembarque. 
BOE, April 29, 2010.
Orden ARM/3315/2010, de 21 de diciembre, por la que se modifica la Orden 
ARM/271/2010, de 10 de febrero, por la que se establecen los criterios para el 
reparto y la gestión de la cuota de caballa, y se regula su captura y desembarque. 
BOE, December 22, 2010.
Economic structure of fishing activity: An analysis of mackerel... 109
Prellezo, R. (2011). Datos económicos de la flota de la CAPV. Technical report 
drawn up by AZTI for the Basque Government, Dept. of the Environment, Te-
rritorial Planning, Agriculture and Fisheries, Office for Fisheries and the Food 
Industry, Spain.
Prellezo, R., Murillas, A., Sánchez, S. and Uriarte, A. (2010). Plan de gestión del 
verdel 2011. Research project conducted by AZTI for the Basque Government, 
Dept. of the Environment, Territorial Planning, Agriculture and Fisheries, Office 
for Fisheries and the Food Industry, Spain.
Putten, I.E. van, Kulmala, S., Thévaud, O., Dowling, N, Hamon, K.G., Hutton, T. 
and Pascoe, S. (2011). “Theories and behavioural drivers underlying fleet dyna-
mics models”. Fish and Fisheries, 13(2): 216-235. http://doi.org/fkd6vj.
Shephard, R.W. (1953). Cost and production functions. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton N.J.
Tran, N.B. and Smith, V.K. (1983). “The role of air and water residuals for steam 
electric power generation”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, 10(1): 35-49. http://doi.org/ftxzhh.
